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a b s t r a c t
Gorrieri and Martinelli’s timed Generalized Non-Deducibility on Compositions (tGNDC)
schema is awell-known general framework for the formal verification of security protocols
in a concurrent scenario. We generalise the tGNDC schema to verify wireless network
security protocols. Our generalisation relies on a simple timed broadcasting process calculus
whose operational semantics is given in terms of a labelled transition system which is
used to derive a standard simulation theory. We apply our tGNDC framework to perform
a security analysis of three well-known key management protocols for wireless sensor
networks: µTESLA, LEAP+ and LiSP.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Wireless sensors are small and cheap devices powered by low-energy batteries, equipped with radio transceivers,
and responding to physical stimuli, such as pressure, magnetism and motion, by emitting radio signals. Such devices
are featured with resource constraints (involving power, storage and computation) and low transmission rates. Wireless
sensor networks (WSNs) are large-scale networks of sensor nodes deployed in strategic areas to gather data. Sensor nodes
collaborate usingwireless communicationswith an asymmetricmany-to-one data transfermodel. Typically, they send their
sensed events or data to a specific node, called sink node or base station, which collects the requested information. WSNs
are primarily designed for monitoring environments that humans cannot easily reach (e.g., motion, target tracking, fire
detection, chemicals, temperature); they are used as embedded systems (e.g., biomedical sensor engineering, smart homes)
or mobile applications (e.g., when attached to robots, soldiers, or vehicles).
An important issue in WSNs is network security: sensor nodes are vulnerable to several kinds of threats and risks. Unlike
wired networks, wireless devices use radio frequency channels to broadcast their messages. An adversary can compromise
a sensor node, alter the integrity of the data, eavesdrop on messages, inject fake messages, and waste network resource.
Thus, one of the challenges in developing trustworthy WSNs is to provide high-security features with limited resources.
Generally, in order to have a secure communication between two (or more) parties, a secure association must be
established by sharing a secret. This secret must be created, distributed and updated by one (or more) entity and it is often
represented by the knowledge of a cryptographic key. Themanagement of such cryptographic keys is the core of any security
protocol. Due to resource limitations, all keymanagement protocols forWSNs, such asµTESLA [1], LiSP [2], LEAP [3], PEBL [4]
and INF [5], are based on symmetric cryptography rather than heavy public-key schemes, such as Diffie–Hellman [6] and
RSA [7].
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In this paper, we adopt a process calculus approach to formalise and verify real-world key management protocols for
WSNs. A process calculus is a formal and concise language that allows us to express system behaviour in the form of a
process term. We propose a simple timed broadcasting process calculus, called aTCWS, for modelling wireless networks.
The time model we adopt is known as the fictitious clock approach (see e.g. [8]): A global clock is supposed to be updated
whenever all nodes agree on this, by globally synchronising on a special timing action σ .1 Broadcast communications span
over a limited area, called transmission range. Both broadcast actions and internal actions are assumed to take no time.
This is a reasonable assumption whenever the duration of those actions is negligible with respect to the chosen time unit.
The operational semantics of our calculus is given in terms of a labelled transition semantics in the SOS style of Plotkin.
The calculus enjoys standard time properties, such as: time determinism, maximal progress, and patience [8]. The labelled
transition semantics is used to derive a (weak) simulation theory which can be easily mechanised by relying on well-known
interactive theorem provers such as Isabelle/HOL [10] or Coq [11].
Based on our simulation theory, we generalise Gorrieri and Martinelli’s timed Generalized Non-Deducibility on
Compositions (tGNDC) schema [12,13], a well-known general framework for the formal verification of timed security
properties. The basic idea of tGNDC is the following: a protocolM satisfies tGNDC ρ(M) if the presence of an arbitrary attacker
does not affect the behaviour of M with respect to the abstraction ρ(M). By varying ρ(M) it is possible to express different
timed security properties for the protocol M . Examples are the timed integrity property, which ensures the freshness of
authenticated packets, and the timed agreement property, when agreement between two parties must be reached within a
certain deadline. In order to avoid the universal quantification over all possible attackers when proving tGNDC properties,
we provide a compositional proof technique based on the notion of the most powerful attacker .
We use our calculus to provide a formal specification of three well-known key management protocols for WSNs:
(i) µTESLA [1], which achieves authenticated broadcast; (ii) the Localized Encryption and Authentication Protocol, LEAP+ [3],
intended for large-scale wireless sensor networks; (iii) the Lightweight Security Protocol, LiSP [2], that, through an efficient
mechanism of re-keying, provides a good trade-off between resource consumption and network security.
We perform a tGNDC-based analysis on these three protocols. As a result of our analysis, we formally prove that
the authenticated-broadcast phase of µTESLA enjoys both timed integrity and timed agreement. Then, we prove that the
single-hop pairwise shared keymechanism of LEAP+ enjoys timed integrity but not timed agreement, due to the presence of a
replay attack despite the security assessment of [3]. Finally, we prove that the LiSP protocol satisfies neither timed integrity
nor timed agreement. Again, this is due to the presence of a replay attack. To our knowledge both attacks are new and they
have not yet appeared in the literature.
We end this introduction with an outline of the paper. In Section 2, we provide syntax, operational semantics and
behavioural semantics of aTCWS. In the same sectionwe prove that our calculus enjoys time determinism,maximal progress
and patience. In Section 3, we adapt Gorrieri and Martinelli’s tGNDC framework to aTCWS. In Sections 4–6 we provide a
security analysis of the three key management protocols mentioned above. The paper ends with a section on conclusions,
future and related work.
2. The calculus
In Table 1, we provide the syntax of our applied Timed Calculus for Wireless Systems, in short aTCWS, in a two-level
structure: A lower one for processes and an upper one for networks. We assume a set Nds of logical node names, ranged
over by letters m, n. Var is the set of variables, ranged over by x, y, z. We define Val to be the set of values, and Msg to be
the set ofmessages, i.e., closed values that do not contain variables. Letters u, u1 . . . range over Val, and w, w′ . . . range over
Msg .
Both syntax and operational semantics of aTCWS are parametric with respect to a given decidable inference system, i.e. a










allow us to deal with pairs of values. We write w1 . . . wk ⊢r w0 to denote an application of rule r to the closed values
w1 . . . wk to infer w0. Given an inference system, the deduction function D : 2Msg → 2Msg associates a (finite) set φ of
messages to the set D(φ) of messages that can be deduced from φ, by applying instances of the rules of the inference
system.
Networks are collections of nodes running in parallel and using a unique common channel to communicate with each
other. All nodes have the same transmission range (this is a quite common assumption in models for ad hoc networks [14]).
The communication paradigm is local broadcast: only nodes located in the range of the transmitter may receive data. We
write n[P]ν for a node named n (the device network address) executing the sequential process P . The tag ν contains the
neighbours of n (ν ⊆ Nds \ {n}). In other words, ν contains all nodes in the transmission cell of n (except n itself), thus
1 Time synchronisation relies on some clock synchronisation protocol [9].




M,N ::= 0 empty network M1 | M2 parallel composition n[P]ν node
Processes:
P,Q ::= nil termination !⟨u⟩.P broadcast ⌊?(x).P⌋Q receiver with timeout  
i∈I τ .Pi

Q internal choice with timeout σ .P sleep [u1 = u2]P;Q matching [u1 . . . un ⊢r x]P;Q deduction H⟨ũ⟩ guarded recursion
modelling the network topology.2 For simplicity, when ν = {m} we will omit parentheses. Our wireless networks have a
fixed topology as node mobility is not relevant to our analysis.
Processes are sequential and live within the nodes. We let Prc be the set of all possible processes. We write nil to denote
the skip process. The sender process !⟨w⟩.P allows to broadcast the message w, the continuation being P . The process




Q denotes internal choice with timeout. The process
σ .P models sleeping for one time unit. The process [w1 = w2]P;Q is the standard ‘‘if then else’’ construct. The process
[w1 . . . wk ⊢r x]P;Q tries to infer a message w from the premises w1 . . . wk by an application of rule r.




Q and σ .Q , the occurrences of P , Pi and Q are said to be guarded; the
occurrences of Q are also said to be time-guarded. In the processes ⌊?(x).P⌋Q and [w1 . . . wn ⊢r x]P the variable x is said
to be bound in P . A variable which is not bound is said to be free. We adopt the standard notion of α-conversion on bound
variables andwe identify processes up to α-conversion.We assume there are no free variables in our networks. The absence
of free variables will be maintained as networks evolve. We write {w/x}P for the substitution of the variable x with the
message w in P . In order to deal with (guarded) recursion, we assume a set PrcIds of process identifiers ranged over by
H,H ′,H1,H2. We write H⟨w1, . . . , wk⟩ to denote a recursive process H defined via an equation H(x1, . . . , xk) = P , where
(i) the tuple x1, . . . , xk contains all the variables that appear free in P , and (ii) P contains only guarded occurrences of the
process identifiers, such asH itself. We say that recursion is time-guarded if P contains only time-guarded occurrences of the
process identifiers. Wewrite Prcwt for the set of processes in which summations are finite-indexed and recursive definitions
are time-guarded.
Remark 2.1. The recursion construct allows us to define persistent listeners, i.e., receivers which wait indefinitely for




We report some notational conventions. We write

i∈I Mi to mean the parallel composition of all Mi, for i ∈ I . We
identify

i∈I Mi = 0 if I = ∅. We write σ
k.P as an abbreviation for σ . . . . .σ .P , where prefix σ appears k times. The process
[w1 = w2]P is an abbreviation for [w1 = w2]P; nil. Similarly, wewill write [w1 . . . wn ⊢r x]P tomean [w1 . . . wn ⊢r x]P; nil.
In the sequel, we will make use of a standard notion of structural congruence to abstract over processes that differ for
minor syntactic differences.
Definition 2.2. Structural congruence over networks, written ≡, is defined as the smallest equivalence relation, preserved
by parallel composition, which is a commutative monoid with respect to parallel composition and internal choice, and for
which n[H⟨w̃⟩]ν ≡ n[{w̃/̃x}P]ν , if H(x̃) = P .
Here, we provide some definitions that will be useful in the remainder of the paper. Given a network M where all





nds (M1 | M2) = nds (M1) ∪ nds (M2). For m ∈ nds (M), the function ngh(m,M) returns the set of the neighbours of m in
M . Thus, if M ≡ m[P]ν | N then ngh(m,M) = ν. We write Env (M) to mean all the nodes of the environment reachable by
the networkM . Formally, Env (M) = ∪m∈nds(M)ngh(m,M) \ nds (M).
The syntax provided in Table 1 allows us to derive networks which are somehow ill-formed. The following definition
identifies well-formed networks. Basically, it (i) rules out networks containing two nodes with the same name; (ii) rules
2 We could have represented the topology in terms of a restriction operator à la CCS on node names; we have preferred our notation to keep at hand the
neighbours of a node.
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−−−−→ N ′ µ := ν\nds (N)
M | N
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out self-neighbouring; (iii) imposes symmetric neighbouring relations (we recall that all nodes have the same transmission
range); (iv) imposes network connectivity to allow clock synchronisation.
Definition 2.3 (Well-formedness). M is said to be well-formed if
• M ≡ N | m1[P1]ν1 | m2[P2]ν2 impliesm1 ≠ m2;
• M ≡ N | m[P]ν implies m ∉ ν;
• M ≡ N | m1[P1]ν1 | m2[P2]ν2 , withm1 ∈ ν2, impliesm2 ∈ ν1;
• for allm, n ∈ nds (M) there arem1, . . . ,mk ∈ nds (M), such thatm = m1, n = mk,mi ∈ ngh(mi+1,M), for 1 ≤ i ≤ k−1.
We let Net be the set of well-formed networks.
Henceforth, we will always work with networks in Net .
2.1. Labelled transition semantics
In Table 2, we provide a labelled transition system (LTS) foraTCWS in the SOS style of Plotkin. Intuitively, the computation
proceeds in lock-steps: between every global synchronisation all nodes proceed asynchronously by performing actions
with no duration, which represent either broadcast or input or internal actions. Transmission proceeds even if there are
no listeners: sending is a non-blocking action. Moreover, communication is lossy as some receivers within the range of the
transmitter might not receive the message. This may be due to several reasons such as signal interferences or the presence
of obstacles.
Themetavariableλ ranges over the set of labels {τ , σ ,m!w◃ν,m?w}denoting internal action, timepassing, broadcasting
and reception. Let us comment on the transition rules of Table 2. In rule (Snd) a sender m dispatches a message w to its
neighbours ν, and then continues as P . In rule (Rcv) a receiver n gets amessagew coming from a neighbour nodem, and then
evolves into process P , where all the occurrences of the variable x are replacedwithw. If nomessage is received in the current
time slot, a timeout fires and the node nwill continue with process Q , according to the rule (σ -Rcv). The rule (RcvPar)models
the composition of two networks receiving the samemessage from the same transmitter. Rule (RcvEnb) says that every node
can synchronisewith an external transmitterm. Notice that a node n[⌊?(x).P⌋Q ]ν might execute rule (RcvEnb) instead of rule
(Rcv). This is because a potential receiver maymiss amessage for several reasons (internal misbehaving, interferences, weak
radio signal, etc.); in this manner we model message loss. Rule (Bcast)models the propagation of messages on the broadcast
channel. Note that this rule loses track of the neighbours of m that are in N . Thus, in the label m!w◃ν the set ν always
contains the neighbours ofmwhich can receive the message w. Rule (Tau) models local computations within a node due to
a nondeterministic internal choice. Rule (TauPar) propagates internal computations on parallel components. The remaining
rules model the passage of time. Rule (Sleep) models sleeping for one time slot. Rules (σ -nil) and (σ -0) are straightforward.
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−−→ n[Q ′]ν w1 ≠ w2













−−→ n[R]ν w1. . .wn ⊢r w






−−→ n[R]ν ̸ ∃ w. w1. . .wn ⊢r w
n[[w1. . .wn ⊢r x]P;Q ]ν
λ
−−→ n[R]ν
Rule (σ -Rcv) models timeout on receivers, and similarly rule (σ -Sum) describes timeout on internal activities. Rule (σ -Par)
models time synchronisation between parallel components. Rules (Bcast) and (TauPar) have their symmetric counterparts.
Table 3 reports the standard rules for nodes containing matching, recursion or deduction.
Below, we report a number of basic properties of our LTS.
Proposition 2.4. Let M, M1 and M2 be well-formed networks.
1. m ∉ nds (M) if and only if M
m?w
−−−−→ N, for some network N.
2. M1 | M2
m?w




−−−−→ N2 with N = N1 | N2.
3. If M
m!w◃µ
−−−−−→ M ′ then M ≡ m[!⟨w⟩.P]ν | N, for some m, ν , P and N such that m[!⟨w⟩.P]ν
m!w◃ν
−−−−−→ m[P]ν , N
m?w
−−−−→ N ′,
M ′ ≡ m[P]ν | N ′ and µ = ν \ nds (N).
4. If M
τ










−−→ m[Ph]ν , for
some h ∈ I , and M ′ ≡ m[Ph]ν | N.
5. M1 | M2
σ




−−→ N2 and N = N1 | N2.
As the topology of our networks is static it is easy to prove the following result.
Proposition 2.5. Let M be well-formed. If M
λ
−−→ M ′ then M ′ is well-formed.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of the transitionM
λ
−−→ M ′. 
2.2. Time properties
Our calculus aTCWS enjoys some desirable time properties. Here, we outline the most significant ones. Proposition 2.6
formalises the deterministic nature of time passing: a network can reach at most one new state by executing a σ -action.
Proposition 2.6 (Time Determinism). If M is a well-formed network with M
σ
−−→ M ′ and M
σ
−−→ M ′′, then M ′ and M ′′ are
syntactically the same.
Proof. By induction on the length of the proof ofM
σ
−−→ M ′. 
Patience guarantees that a process will wait indefinitely until it can communicate [8]. In our setting, this means that if
no transmissions can start then it must be possible to execute a σ -action to let time pass.
Proposition 2.7 (Patience). Let M ≡

i∈I mi[Pi]
νi be a well-formed network, such that for all i ∈ I it holds that mi[Pi]νi ≢
mi[!⟨w⟩.Qi]νi , then there is a network N such that M
σ
−−→ N.
Proof. By induction on the structure ofM . 
The maximal progress property says that processes communicate as soon as a possibility of communication arises [8]. In
other words, the passage of time cannot block transmissions.
Proposition 2.8 (Maximal Progress). Let M be a well-formed network. If M ≡ m[!⟨w⟩.P]ν | N then M
σ
−−→ M ′ for no
network M ′.
Proof. By inspection on the rules that can be used to deriveM
σ
−−→ M ′, because sender nodes cannot perform σ -actions. 
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Basically, time cannot pass unless the specification itself explicitly asks for it. This approach provides a lot of power to
the specification, which can precisely handle the flowing of time. Such an extra expressive power leads, as a drawback, to
the possibility of abuses. For instance, infinite loops of broadcast actions or internal computations prevent time passing.
Thewell-timedness (or finite variability) property [15] puts a limitation on the number of instantaneous actions that can fire
between two contiguous σ -actions. Intuitively, well-timedness says that time passing never stops: Only a finite number of
instantaneous actions can fire between two subsequent σ -actions.
Definition 2.9 (Well-timedness). A network M satisfies well-timedness if there exists an upper bound k ∈ N such that
whenever M
λ1
−−→ · · ·
λh
−−→ where λj is not directly derived by an application of (RcvEnb) and λj ≠ σ (for 1 ≤ j ≤ h) then
h ≤ k.
The above definition takes into account only transitions denoting an active involvement of the network, that is why we
have left out those transitions which can be derived by applying rule (RcvEnb) directly. However, as aTCWS is basically
a specification language, there is no harm in allowing specifications which do not respect well-timedness. Of course,
when using our language to give a protocol implementation, then one must verify that the implementation satisfies well-
timedness: No real-world service (even attackers) can stop the passage of time.
The following proposition provides a criterion to check well-timedness. We recall that Prcwt denotes the set of processes
where summations are always finite-indexed and recursive definitions are always time-guarded.
Proposition 2.10. Let M =

i∈I mi[Pi]
νi be a network. If Pi ∈ Prcwt, for all i ∈ I , then M satisfies well-timedness.
Proof. First, notice that without an application of rule (RcvEnb) the network M can perform only a finite number of
transitions. Then, proceed by induction on the structure ofM . 
2.3. Behavioural semantics
Based on the LTS of Section 2.1, we define a standard notion of timed labelled similarity for aTCWS. In general, a simulation
describes how a term (in our case a network) can mimic the actions of another term. Here, we focus on weak relations, i.e.,
we abstract on internal actions of networks. Thus, we distinguish between the transmissions which may be observed and
















Rule (Shh)models transmissions that cannot be observed because none of the potential receivers is in the environment. Rule
(Obs) models transmissions that can be received (and hence observed) by those nodes of the environment contained in ν.
Notice that the name of the transmitter is removed from the label. This is motivated by the fact that nodes may refuse to
reveal their identities, e.g. for security reasons or limited sensory capabilities in perceiving these identities. Note also that
in a derivation tree the rule (Obs) can only be applied at top-level.
In the sequel, the metavariable α will range over the following actions: τ , σ , !w◃ν and m?w. We adopt the standard
notation for weak transitions: the relation =⇒ denotes the reflexive and transitive closure of
τ
−−→; the relation α==⇒ denotes
=⇒
α
−−→ =⇒; the relation α̂==⇒ denotes =⇒ if α = τ and α==⇒ otherwise.
Definition 2.11 (Similarity). A relation R over well-formed networks is a simulation if M R N and M
α
−−→ M ′ imply there
is N ′ such that N α̂==⇒ N ′ andM ′ R N ′. We writeM . N , if there is a simulation R such that M R N .
Our notion of similarity between networks is a pre-congruence, as it is preserved by parallel composition.
Theorem 2.12. Let M and N be two well-formed networks such that M . N. Then M | O . N | O for all O such that M | O and
N | O are well-formed.
3. A tGNDC schema for wireless networks
In order to achieve a formal verification of key management protocols for WSNs, we adopt a general schema for the
definition of timed security properties, called timed Generalized Non-Deducibility on Compositions (tGNDC) [12], a real-time
generalisation of Generalized Non-Deducibility on Compositions (GNDC) [16]. The main idea is the following: a system M is
tGNDC ρ(M) if for every attacker A
M
 A . ρ(M)
i.e. the composed systemM | A satisfies the abstraction ρ(M).




msg(!⟨u⟩.P) def= get(u) ∪ msg(P)







i∈I msg(Pi) ∪ msg(Q )
msg(σ .P) def= msg(P)
msg([u1 = u2]P;Q )
def
= get(u1) ∪ get(u2) ∪ msg(P) ∪ msg(Q )





get(ui) ∪ msg(P) ∪ msg(Q )





get(ui) ∪ msg(P) if H(x̃)
def
= P
where get : Val → 2Msg is defined as follows:
get(a) def= {a} (basic message)
get(x) def= ∅ (variable)






get(uj) ∪ {Fi(u1, . . . , uki )} if F




A wireless protocol involves a set of nodes which may be potentially under attack, depending on the proximity to the
attacker. This means that, in general, the attacker of a protocolM is a distinct network A of possibly colluding nodes. For the
sake of compositionality, we assume that each node of the protocol is attacked by exactly one node of A.
Definition 3.1. We say thatA is a set of attacking nodes for the networkM if and only if |A| = |nds (M) | andA∩(nds (M)∪
Env (M)) = ∅.
During the execution of the protocol an attackermay increase its initial knowledge by graspingmessages sent by the parties,
according to Dolev–Yao constraints.
The knowledge of a network is expressed by the set ofmessages that the network canmanipulate. Thus, wewritemsg(P)
to denote the set of the messages that appear in the process P . Formally, we follow [12] and we define msg : Prc → 2Msg
as the least set (fixed point) satisfying the rules in Table 4. A straightforward generalisation of msg( ) to networks is the
following:
msg(0) def= ∅ ; msg(n[P]ν) def= msg(P) ; msg(M1 | M2)
def
= msg(M1) ∪ msg(M2).
Now, everything is in place to formally define our notion of attacker. For simplicity, in the rest of the paper, given a set
of nodes N and a node n, we will write N \ n for N \ {n}, and N ∪ n for N ∪ {n}.
Definition 3.2 (Attacker). Let M be a network, with nds (M) ={m1, . . . ,mk}. Let A = {a1, . . . , ak} be a set of attacking







ai[Qi]µi : Qi ∈ Prcwt, msg(Qi) ⊆ D(φ0), µi=(A \ ai) ∪ mi

.
Remark 3.3. ByProposition 2.10, the requirementQi ∈ Prcwt in the definition ofA
φ0
A/M guarantees that our attackers respects
well-timedness and hence cannot prevent the passage of time.
Sometimes, for verification reasons, wewill be interested in observing part of the protocolM under examination. For this
purpose, we assume that the environment contains a fresh node obs /∈ nds (M) ∪ Env (M) ∪ A, that we call the ‘observer’,
unknown to the attacker. For convenience, the observer cannot transmit: it can only receive messages.
Definition 3.4. Let M=
k
i=1 mi[Pi]
νi . Given a set A={a1, . . . , ak} of attacking nodes for M and fixed a set O ⊆ nds (M) of












(νi ∩ nds (M)) ∪ ai ∪ obs ifmi ∈ O
(νi ∩ nds (M)) ∪ ai otherwise.
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This definition expresses that (i) every node mi of the protocols has a dedicated attacker located at ai, (ii) network and
attacker are considered in isolation, without any external interference, (iii) only obs can observe the behaviour of nodes in
O, (iv) node obs does not interfere with the protocol as it cannot transmit, (v) the behaviour of the nodes in nds (M) \ O is
not observable.
We can now formalise the tGNDC family of properties as follows.
Definition 3.5 (tGNDC for Wireless Networks). Given a network M , an initial knowledge φ0, a set O ⊆ nds (M) of nodes
under observation and an abstraction ρ(M), representing a security property forM , we writeM ∈ tGNDC ρ(M)φ0,O if and only if
for some set A of attacking nodes forM and for every A ∈ Aφ0A/M it holds that
MAO
 A . ρ(M).
It should be noticed that when showing that a systemM is tGNDC ρ(M)φ0,O , the universal quantification on attackers required
by the definition makes the proof quite involved. Thus, we look for a sufficient condition which does not make use of the
universal quantification. For this purpose, we rely on a timed notion of term stability [12]. Intuitively, a network M is said
to be time-dependent stable if the attacker cannot increase its knowledge in a indefinite way when M runs in the space of
a time slot. Thus, we can predict how the knowledge of the attacker evolves at each time slot. To this purpose we need a
formalisation of computation. For Λ = α1 . . . αn, we write
Λ
==⇒ to denote =⇒
α1
−−→ =⇒ · · · =⇒
αn
−−→ =⇒. In order to count how
many time slots embraces an execution trace Λ, we define #σ (Λ) to be the number of occurrences of σ -actions in Λ.
Definition 3.6 (Time-dependent Stability). A network M is said to be time-dependent stable with respect to a sequence of
knowledge {φj}j≥0 if whenever MAnds(M)





= nds (M), then msg(A′) ⊆ D(φj).
The set of messages φj expresses the knowledge of the attacker at the end of the j-th time slot. Time-dependent stability is
a crucial notion that allows us to introduce the notion of most general attacker. Intuitively, given a sequence of knowledge
{φj}j≥0 and a networkM , with P = nds (M), we pick a set A = {a1, . . . , ak} of attacking nodes forM and we define the top
attacker Top
φj
A/P as the network which at (the beginning of) the j-th time slot is aware of the knowledge φj.
Definition 3.7 (Top Attacker). Let M be a network, with P = nds (M) ={m1, . . . ,mk}. Let A = {a1, . . . , ak} be a set of
















Basically, the top attacker Top
φj















In particular, from the j-th time slot onwards, Top
φj
A/P can replay any message in D(φj) to the network under attack.
Moreover, every attackingnode ai can sendmessages to the correspondingnodemi, but, unlike the attackers ofDefinition 3.2,
it does not need to communicate with the other nodes in A as it already owns the full knowledge of the system at time j.
Remark 3.8. Notice that the top attacker ignores message causality within a single time unit. Thus, it knows all messages
in φj already at the beginning of the time slot j. Notice also that, at each time slot, the top attacker acquires all information
that may be transmitted by the protocol at that time independently whether the information is really transmitted or not.
Remark 3.9. The top attacker does not satisfy well-timedness (see Definition 2.9), as the process identifiers involved in the
recursive definition are not time-guarded. However, this is not a problem as we are looking for a sufficient condition which
ensures tGNDC with respect to well-timed attackers.
A first compositional property that involves the top attacker is the following (the symbol ⊎ denotes disjoint union).
Lemma 3.10. Let M = M1 | M2 be time-dependent stable with respect to a sequence of knowledge {φj}j≥0. Let A1 and A2 be




 Topφ0A1⊎A2/nds(M) . M1A1O1  M2A2O2  Topφ0A1/nds(M1)  Topφ0A2/nds(M2).
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The following theorems say that (i) the top attacker Topφ0A/P is strong enough for checking tGNDC, and that (ii) the notion
of the most powerful attacker can be employed to reason in a compositional manner.
Theorem 3.11 (Criterion for tGNDC). Let M be time-dependent stable with respect to a sequence {φj}j≥0, A be a set of attacking
nodes for M and O ⊆ nds (M) = P . Then MAO
 Topφ0A/P . N implies M ∈ tGNDCNφ0,O .
The notion of the most powerful attacker is eventually employed to obtain the compositional property outlined by the
following proposition.
Theorem 3.12 (Compositionality). Let M = M1 | . . . | Mk be time-dependent stable with respect to a sequence of knowledge




 Topφ0Ai/Pi . Ni, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, implies M ∈ tGNDC N1|...|Nkφ0,O1∪...∪Ok .




 . . .  (Mk)AkOk  Topφ0A1/nds(M1)  . . .  Topφ0Ak/nds(Mk) . N1  . . .  Nk.
By applying Lemma 3.10 and Theorem 2.12 we obtain
(M1 | . . . | Mk)
A1⊎...⊎Ak
O1⊎...⊎Ok
 Topφ0A1⊎...⊎Ak/nds(M1|...|Mk) . N1  . . .  Nk.
Thus, by an application of Theorem 3.11 we can deriveM ∈ tGNDC N1|...|Nkφ0,O1⊎...⊎Ok . 
3.1. Two timed security properties
As in [12], we formalise two useful timed properties for security protocols as instances of tGNDC ρφ0,O , by suitably defining
the abstraction function ρ. We will focus on the two following timed properties:
• A timed notion of integrity, called timed integrity, which guarantees that only fresh packets are authenticated.
• A timed notion of authentication, called timed agreement, according towhich if agreement is reached between two parties
then this must happen within a certain deadline, otherwise authentication does not hold.
More precisely, fixed a delay δ, a protocol is said to enjoy the timed integrity property if, whenever a packet pi is
authenticated during the i-th time interval, then this packet was sent at most i − δ time intervals before. For verification
reasons, when expressing time integrity in the tGNDC scheme, wewill introduce in the protocol under examination a special
message authi which is emitted only when the packet pi is authenticated.
A protocol is said to enjoy the timed agreement property if, whenever a responder n has completed a run of the protocol,
apparently with an initiatorm, thenm has initiated the protocol, apparently with n, at most δ time intervals before, and the
two agents agreed on some set of data.When expressing time agreement in the tGNDC scheme, we introduce in the protocol
under examination a special message helloi, which is emitted by the initiator at the i-th run of the protocol, and a special
message endi, emitted by the responder, representing the completion of the protocol launched at run i.
4. A security analysis of µTESLA
The µTESLA protocol was designed by Perrig et al. [17] to provide authenticated broadcast from a base station (bs)
towards all nodes of a wireless network. The protocol is based on a delayed disclosure of symmetric keys, and it requires the
network to be loosely time synchronised. The protocol computes a MAC for every packet to be broadcast, by using different
keys. The transmission time is split into time intervals of ∆int time units each, and each key is tied to one of them. The keys
belongs to a key chain k0, k1, . . . , kn generated by bs by means of a public one-way function F . In order to generate this
chain, bs randomly chooses the last key kn and repeatedly applies F to compute all the other keys, whereby ki := F(ki+i), for
0 ≤ i ≤ n−1. The key-chain mechanism together with the one-way function F , provides two major advantages: (i) a key
ki can be used to generate the beginning of the chain k0, . . . , ki−1, by simply applying F as many time as necessary, but it
cannot be used to generate any of the subsequent keys; (ii) any of the keys k0, . . . , ki−1 can be used to authenticate ki. Each
node mj is pre-loaded with amaster key kbs:mj for unicast communications with bs.
The µTESLA protocol is constituted by two main phases: bootstrapping new receivers and authenticated broadcast . The
former establishes the node’s initial setting in order to start receiving the authenticated packets, the latter describes the
transmission of authenticated information.
In the first phase, when a new node m wishes to join the network it sends a request message to the base station bs
containing its name and a nonce nj, where j counts the number of bootstrapping requests:
m −→ bs : nj | m.3
The base station replies with a message of initialisation of the following form:
bs −→ m : ∆int | i | kl | l | mac

kbs:m , (nj | ∆int | i | kl | l)







= [qi ki ⊢mac ui] build MAC with payload and key
[ui qi ⊢pair pi] build packet with mac and payload
!⟨pi⟩.σ . broadcast packet, synchronise
!⟨ki−1⟩.σ . broadcast previous key, synchronise
Si+1 and go to next sending state
Receiver:
R(i, l, r, kl)
def
= ⌊?(p).σ .P⟨i, l, p, r, kl⟩⌋ receive a pkt, synchronise, go to P
Q ⟨i, l, r, kl⟩ if timeout go to Q
P(i, l, p, r, kl)
def
= ⌊?(k).T ⟨i, l, p, r, kl, k⟩⌋ receive a key k and move to T
R⟨i+1, l, p, kl⟩ if timeout go to next receiving state
T (i, l, p, r, kl, k)
def
= [F i−1−l(k) = kl] authenticate key k with F and kl
[r ⊢fst u] extract MAC from previous pkt r
[r ⊢snd q] extract payload from r
[q k ⊢mac u′] build MAC for r with key k
[u = u′] check MACs to authenticate r
σ .Z⟨i+1, i−1, p, r, k⟩;
σ .R⟨i+1, i−1, p, k⟩;
σ .R⟨i+1, i−1, p, k⟩;
σ .R⟨i+1, l, p, kl⟩
Z(i, l, p, r, kl)
def
= R⟨i, l, p, kl⟩ authenticated-broadcast succeeded
Q (i, l, r, kl)
def
= ⌊?(k).T ⟨i, l, r, r, kl, k⟩⌋ receive a key, synchronise, and
R⟨i+1, l, r, kl⟩ go to next receiving state
where i is the current time interval of bs, kl is a key in the key chain, and l, with l < i, represents the time interval in which
kl was employed for packet encryption. The secret key kbs:m is used to authenticate unicast messages; the nonce nj allows
the nodem to verify the freshness of the reply coming from bs.
In the authenticated-broadcast phase, at each time interval i, one or more packets pi are deployed by bs, each one
containing the payload and the MAC calculated with the key ki bound to the i-th time interval. Thus, at time interval i
the bs broadcasts the authenticated message:
bs −→ ∗ : pi | mac(pi, ki).
In the same time interval i, the key tied to the previous time interval i − 1 is disclosed to all receivers, so that they can
authenticate all the previously received packets:
bs −→ ∗ : ki−1.
Loose time synchronisation on the key disclosure time prevents malicious nodes to forge packets with modified payloads.
Nodes discard packets containing MACs calculated with already disclosed keys, as those packets could come from an
attacker. In this phase, the nodes exploit the two main advantages of the key chain and the one-way function F : (i) the
last received key ki can be authenticated by means of F and the last authenticated key kl; (ii) lost keys can be recovered by
applying F to the last received key ki. For instance, suppose that bs has sent packet p1 (containing a MAC with key k1) in the
first time interval, packet p2 in the second time interval and packet p3 in the third one. If the key k1 is correctly received
by a node m while keys k2 and k3 get lost, then m can only authenticate the packet p1 but not p2 or p3. However, if m gets
the key k4 then m can authenticate k4 by using k1, and it can also recover the lost keys k2 and k3 to authenticate p2 and p3,
respectively.
Our security analysis ofµTESLA focuses on the authenticated-broadcast phase which represents the core of the protocol.
Encoding in aTCWS. In Table 5 we provide an encoding of the authenticated-broadcast phase of µTESLA. Our encoding
contains a few simplifications with respect to the original protocol. We assume that the duration of the time interval ∆int
is fixed and it is already known by the nodes. In our encoding, this time interval corresponds to two σ -actions. We assume
that in each time interval i the sender broadcasts alternately only one packet pi and the key ki−1 of the previous time
interval. Thus, we assume a sequence q1, q2, . . . of payloads to be authenticated by using the corresponding keys k1, k2, . . . .
Moreover, we do not model the recovery of lost keys, hence the payload qi can only be authenticated by receiving the
key ki. This simplification yields a easier to read model which can be generalised to fulfil the original requirements of the
protocol.
The encoding essentially defines two kind of processes: the senders Si, and the receivers R(i, l, r, kl), where i is the current
time interval, r is the last received packet, l is the time interval when the last key kl was authenticated. Since we bind one
packet to one key, i also refers to the index number of packets.
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The authenticated-broadcast phase of µTESLA can be represented as follows:
µTESLA def= bs[σ .S1]νbs
 m1[σ .R⟨1, −1, ⊥, kbs⟩]νm1  . . .  mh[σ .R⟨1, −1, ⊥, kbs⟩]νmh
where m ∈ νbs and bs ∈ νm, for every m ∈ {m1, . . . ,mh}. We use ⊥ because at the beginning there is no packet to
authenticate. We write kbs to denote the key transmitted by the base station bs and authenticated at the node’s site during
the bootstrapping phase. Notice that kbs is associated to the time interval −1.
4.1. Timed integrity
In this section, we show that the authenticated-broadcast phase of µTESLA enjoys timed integrity. In particular, we prove
that receivers authenticate only packets that have been sent 2∆int time units before (that is, four σ -actions before) in the
correct order, even in the presence of an intruder. The crucial point is that even if an attacker acquires the shared keys then
it is ‘‘too late’’ to break integrity, i.e., to authenticate packets which are more than 2∆int time units old.
We signal authentication of a packet r by broadcasting a special packet pair(auth, r). Thus, we replace the process
R(i, l, r, kl) of Table 5 with R′(i, l, r, kl), where the process Z(i, l, p, r, kl) is replaced by
Z ′(i, l, p, r, kl)
def
= [auth r ⊢pair t]!⟨t⟩.R′⟨i, l, p, kl⟩.
The formalisation of the authenticated-broadcast phase for µTESLA becomes the following:
µTESLA′ def= bs[σ .S1]νbs
 m1[σ .R′⟨1, −1, ⊥, kbs⟩]νm1  . . .  mh[σ .R′⟨1, −1, ⊥, kbs⟩]νmh .
We define the timed integrity property as the following abstraction of the protocol µTESLA′:
ρ(µTESLA′) def= bs[σ .S1]obs
 m1[σ .R̂1]obs  . . .  mh[σ .R̂1]obs
where S1 is the process defined in Table 5, while R̂i
def
= σ .⌊τ .σ .!⟨authi−1⟩.R̂i+1⌋R̂i+1. The node obs is the observing node
introduced in Section 3. Here, we abstract on receivers’ behaviour: At time interval i+ 2 they may signal the authentication
of the packet pi = pair(mac(ki, qi), qi) by sending the special packet authi = pair(auth, pi).
The abstraction ρ(µTESLA′) is a faithful representation of the timed integrity property for the authenticated-broadcast
phase of µTESLA.






−−−−−−−→ M then #σ (Ω) = 4.
In order to show that µTESLA′ satisfies timed integrity, we will prove that














= φi−1 ∪ {kj−1} if j > 0 and i = 2j
φi
def
= φi−1 ∪ {pj+1, authj−1} if j > 0 and i = 2j + 1.
(1)
We fix an attackingnode aj for eachmj, with 1 ≤ j ≤ h, and an attackingnode b for bs. By applying the compositional criterion
of Theorem 3.12, it suffices to prove a simpler integrity result for each node in isolation composed with its corresponding
top attacker.
Lemma 4.2. Given an attacking node b for bs and the attacking nodes aj for mj, with 1 ≤ j ≤ h, and fixed the sequence of
knowledge {φi}i≥0 as in (1), then the encoding in Table 5 satisfies the following:
1. bs[σ .S1]{b,obs}
 Topφ0b/bs . bs[σ .S1]obs
2. mj[σ .R′⟨1, −1, ⊥, k̄⟩]{aj,obs}
 Topφ0aj/mj . mj[σ .R̂1]obs, for 1 ≤ j ≤ h.
Theorem 4.3 (µTESLA Timed Integrity). The protocol µTESLA′ satisfies timed integrity:





Proof. By applying Lemma 4.2 and Theorem 3.12. 
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4.2. Timed agreement
The timed agreement property for the authenticated-broadcast phase µTESLA requires that when the receiver mj
completes the protocol, apparently with the initiator bs, then bs has initiated the protocol, apparently with mj, at most
2∆int time intervals before, and the two parties agree on the sent data. In other words, the packet pi is authenticated by mj
exactly 2∆int time units after it has been sent by bs. This says that any formulation of timed agreement for µTESLA would
actually coincide with timed integrity. Thus, Proposition 4.1 demonstrates that ρ(µTESLA′) is also a faithful abstraction of
timed agreement. As a consequence, Theorem 4.3 also says that µTESLA satisfies timed agreement.
5. A security analysis of LEAP+
The LEAP+protocol [3] provides a keyingmechanism to establish authenticated communications. The protocol is designed
to establish four types of keys: an individual key, shared between a base station and a node, a single-hop pair-wise key, shared
between two sensor nodes, a cluster key, shared between a node and all its neighbourhood, a group key, shared between a
base station and all sensor nodes of the network.
In this section, we focus on the single-hop pairwise key mechanism as it is underlying to all other keying methods. This
mechanism is aimed at establishing a pair-wise key between a sensor node and a neighbours in ∆leap time units. In order
to do that, LEAP+ exploits two peculiarities of sensor nodes: (i) the set of neighbours of a node is relatively static, and (ii) a
sensor node that is being added to the network will discover most of its neighbours at the time of its initial deployment.
The single-hop pairwise shared key mechanism of LEAP+ consists of three phases.
Key pre-distribution. A network controller fixes an initial key kin and a computational efficient pseudo-random function
prf(). Both kin and prf() are pre-loaded in each node, before deployment. Then, each node r derives itsmaster key:
kr := prf(kin, r).
Neighbour discovery. As soon as a nodem is scattered in the network area it tries to discover its neighbours by broadcasting
a hello packet that contains its identity,m, and a freshly created nonce ni, where i counts the number of attempts:
m −→ ∗ : m | ni.
Then each neighbour r replieswith an ackmessagewhich includes its identity r , the correspondingMAC calculated
by using r ’s master key kr , to guarantee authenticity, and the nonce ni, to guarantee freshness. Specifically:
r −→ m : r | mac(kr , (r | ni)).
Pairwise Key Establishment. When m receives the packet q from r , it tries to authenticate it by using the last created nonce
ni and r ’s master key kr = prf(kin, r). Notice that m can calculate kr as kin and prf have been pre-loaded in m,
and r is contained in q. If the authentication succeeds, then both nodes proceed in calculating the pairwise key
km:r := prf(kr ,m). Any other message between m and r will be authenticated by using the pairwise key km:r . If
m does not get an authenticated packet from the responder in due time, it sends a new hello packet with a fresh
nonce.
Encoding in aTCWS. In Table 6, we provide an encoding of the single-hop pairwise shared key mechanism of LEAP+. For the
sake of clarity, we assume that ∆leap consists of two time slots, i.e. it takes two σ -actions. To yield an easier to read model,
we consider only two nodes and we define
LEAP+ def= m[σ .S1]νm
 r[σ .R]νr
where m is the initiator, r is the responder, with m ∈ νr and r ∈ νm. Moreover, we assume that r has already computed its
master key kr := prf(kin, r). This simple model does not lose in generality with respect to the multiple nodes case.
5.1. Timed agreement
The timed agreement property for LEAP+ requires that the responder r successfully completes the protocol initiated by
m, with the broadcasting of a hello packet, in at most ∆leap time units (i.e. two σ -actions). We will show that LEAP+ does
not satisfy the timed agreement property. Intuitively, due to the presence of the attacker, r may wrongly believe it has
established a pairwise key withm, whereasmwill indefinitely send new hello packets. In some respect, this may be viewed
as a kind of denial-of-service attack.
For our analysis, in order to make observable the completion of the protocol, we define LEAP′+ by replacing in LEAP+ the
process R of Table 6 with the process R′ defined as the same as R except for process R6 which is replaced by
R6
′ def
= σ .[end n ⊢pair e]!⟨e⟩.nil.
We use the following abbreviations: helloi
def
= pair(hello, pair(m, ni)) and endi
def
= pair(end, ni).






= [ni−1 m ⊢prf ni] build a random nonce ni
[m ni ⊢pair t] build a pair t withm and the nonce ni
[hello t ⊢pair p] build hello packet using the pair t
!⟨p⟩.σ .P broadcast hello, synchronise and move to P
P def= ⌊?(q).P1⌋Si+1 wait for response from neighbours
P1 def= [q ⊢fst r]P2; σ .Si+1 extract node name r from packet q,
P2 def= [q ⊢snd h] extract MAC h from packet q
[r ni ⊢pair t ′] build a pair t ′ with r and current nonce ni
[kin r ⊢prf kr ] calculate r ’s master key kr
[kr t ′ ⊢mac h′] calculate MAC h′ with kr and t ′
[h′ = h]P3; σ .Si+1 if it matches with the received one go to P3 ,
otherwise go to next time unit and restart
P3 def= [kr m ⊢prf km:r ]P4 calculate the pairwise key km:r
P4 def= σ .nil synchronise and conclude key establishment
Receiver at node r:
R def= ⌊?(p).R1⌋σ .R wait for incoming hello packets
R1 def= [p ⊢fst p1]R2; σ .σ .R extract the first component
R2 def= [p ⊢snd p2] extract the second component
[p1 = hello]R3; σ .σ .R check if p is a hello packet
R3 def= [p2 ⊢fst m]R4; σ .σ .R extract the sender namem
R4 def= [p2 ⊢snd n] extract the nonce n
[r n ⊢pair t] build a pair t with n and r
[kr t ⊢mac h] calculate MAC h on t with r ’s master key kr
[r h ⊢pair q] build packet q with node name r and MAC h
σ .!⟨q⟩.R5 synchronise, broadcast q and go to R5
R5 def= [kr m ⊢prf km:r ]R6 calculate pairwise key km:r
R6 def= σ .nil synchronise and conclude key establishment
The timed agreement property of LEAP+ is defined by the following abstraction:
ρagr(LEAP′+)
def
= m[σ .S̄1]obs | r[σ .R̄1]obs
where S̄i
def
= !⟨helloi⟩.σ⌊τ .σ .nil⌋S̄i+1 and R̄i
def
= ⌊τ .σ !⟨qi⟩.σ .!⟨endi⟩.nil⌋σ .R̄i+1, with qi = pair(r,mac(kr , pair(r, ni))), as
defined in Table 6.
The following statement says that the abstraction ρagr(LEAP′+) expresses correctly the timed agreement property for
LEAP+.








−−−−−−−→ then #σ (Ω) = 2.
Now, in order to prove timed agreement for LEAP+ we should show that
LEAP′+ ∈ tGNDC ρagr (LEAP
′+)
φ0,{m,r}
for some appropriate φ0. This would imply that all traces of the system composed by LEAP′+ in parallel with an attacker can
be mimicked by ρagr(LEAP′+).
However, this is not the case, as stated by the following theorem.
Theorem 5.2 (Replay Attack to LEAP+).
LEAP′+ ∉ tGNDC ρagr (LEAP
′+)
∅,{m,r} .





Let us fix the initial knowledge φ0 = ∅, so to deal with the most general situation. We set νa = {m, b} and νb = {r, a}, and




are observable, thus νm = {r, a, obs} and νr = {m, b, obs}. We give an intuition of
the replay attack in Table 7. Basically, the attacker delays the reception of the packet p1 at m which cannot complete the
protocol within two time slots, but only after four time slots, thus breaking agreement. Formally, we define the attacker
A ∈ Aφ0A/{m,r} as follows:
A = a[σ .X]νa | b[σ 2.X]νb
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Table 7
Replay attack to LEAP+.
m −→ ∗ : hello1 m starts the protocol, but hello1 is grasped by a and missed by r
σ
−−→ the system moves to the next time slot
a −→ b : hello1 a sends hello1 to b
σ
−−→ the system moves to the next time slot
b −→ r : hello1 b replays hello1 to r
m −→ ∗ : hello2 m broadcasts hello2 (containing a fresh nonce n2), which gets lost
σ
−−→ the system moves to the next time slot
r −→ m : q1 r replies by sending q1 (which is discarded bym)
σ
−−→ the system moves to the next time slot
r −→ ∗ : end1 r signals the end of the protocol
where X = ⌊?(x).σ .!⟨x⟩.nil⌋nil. Now, we consider the system
(LEAP′+)A
 A = m[σ .S1]νm  r[σ .R′]νr  A
and we find that it admits the following execution trace
σ . !hello1◃obs . σ . τ . σ . τ . !hello2◃obs . σ . !q1◃obs . σ . !end1◃obs
where the packet hello1 and the corresponding packet end1 are divided by four σ -actions (we report the corresponding
computation in the Appendix). Proposition 5.1 says that this trace cannot be mimicked by the abstraction ρagr(µTESLA′boot).
As a consequence, the timed agreement property for LEAP+ does not hold. 
5.2. Timed integrity
The timed integrity property for LEAP+ says that hello messages and authentication messages with the same nonce must
differ for at most ∆leap time units. We show that LEAP+ satisfies the timed integrity property. For doing that, we slightly
modify the specification of LEAP+ to make observable key authentication. We define
LEAP′′+ def= m[σ .S ′′1 ]
νm
 r[σ .R]νr
where the process S ′′i is the same as process Si of Table 6, except for process P
4 which is replaced by
P4
′′ def
= σ .[auth t ⊢pair a]!⟨a⟩.nil.
For simplicity, we use the following abbreviation: authi = pair(auth, pair(m, ni)).














By construction, ρint(LEAP′′+) is a faithful representation of timed integrity for LEAP+ (we recall that in our encoding ∆leap
corresponds to two σ -actions).








−−−−−−−→ M then #σ (Ω) = 2.











= φi−1 ∪ {mac(kr , pair(r, nj))} if j > 0 and i = 2j
φi
def
= φi−1 ∪ {helloj+1, authj} if j > 0 and i = 2j + 1.
(2)
Now, we pick two attacking nodes a and b, for m and r , respectively, and we focus on the observation of node m as it
signals both the beginning and the end of the authentication protocol. Again, by applying Theorem 3.12 it suffices to prove
a simpler result for each node in isolation composed with its corresponding top attacker.
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Lemma 5.4. Given two attacking nodes a and b, for m and r respectively, and fixed the sequence of knowledge {φi}i≥0 as in (2),
then
1. m[σ .S ′′1 ]
{a,obs}
 Topφ0a/m . m[σ .Ŝ1]obs
2. r[σ .R]{b}
 Topφ0b/r . r[Tick]∅.
Theorem 5.5 (LEAP+ Timed Integrity). LEAP′′+ satisfies the timed integrity property:




Proof. By applying Lemma 5.4 and Theorem 3.12. 
6. A security analysis of LiSP
In order to achieve a good trade-off between resource limitations and network security, Park et al. [2] have proposed
a Lightweight Security Protocol (LiSP) for WSNs. LiSP provides (i) an efficient key renewal mechanism which avoids key
retransmission, (ii) authentication for each key-disclosure, and (iii) the possibility of both recovering and detecting lost
keys.
A LiSP network consists of a Key Server (ks) and a set of sensor nodes m1, . . . ,mk. The protocol assumes a one way function
F , pre-loaded in every node of the system, and employs two different key families: (i) a set of temporal keys k0, . . . , kn,
computed by ks by means of F , and used by all nodes to encrypt/decrypt data packets; (ii) a set ofmaster keys kks:mj , one for
each nodemj, for unicast communications betweenmj and bs. As inµTESLA, the transmission time is split into time intervals,
each of them is ∆refresh time units long. Thus, each temporal key is tied to a time interval and renewed every ∆refresh time
units. At a time interval i, the temporal key ki is shared by all sensor nodes and it is used for data encryption. Key renewal
relies on loose node time synchronisation among nodes. Each node stores a subset of temporal keys in a buffer of a fixed size,
say swith s << n.
The LiSP protocol consists of the following phases.
Initial Setup. At the beginning, ks randomly chooses a key kn and computes a sequence of temporal keys k0, . . . , kn, by using
the function F , as ki := F(ki+1). Then, ks waits for reconfiguration requests from nodes. More precisely, when ks
receives a reconfiguration request from a nodemj, at time interval i, it unicasts the packet InitKey:
ks −→ mj : enc(kks:mj , (s | ks+i | ∆refresh)) | hash(s | ks+i | ∆refresh).
The operator enc(k, p) represents the encryption of p by using the key of k, while hash(p) generates a message
digest for p by means of a cryptographic hash function used to check the integrity of the packet p. When mj
receives the InitKey packet, it computes the sequence of keys ks+i−1, ks+i−2, . . . , ki by several applications of
the function F to ks+i. Then, it activates ki for data encryption and it stores the remaining keys in its local
buffer; finally it sets up a ReKeyingTimer to expires after ∆refresh/2 time units (this value applies only for the first
rekeying).
Re-Keying. At each time interval i, with i ≤ n, ks employs the active encryption key ki to encode the key ks+i. The resulting
packet is broadcast as an UpdateKey packet:
ks −→ ∗ : enc(ki, ks+i).
When a node receives an UpdateKey packet, it tries to authenticate the key received in the packet; if the node
succeeds in the authentication then it recovers all keys that have been possibly lost and updates its key buffer.
When the time interval i elapses, every node discards ki, activates the key ki+1 for data encryption, and sets up the
ReKeyingTimer to expire after ∆refresh time units for future key switching (after the first time, switching happens
every ∆refresh time units).
Authentication and Recovery of Lost Keys. The one-way function F is used to authenticate and recover lost keys. If l is the
number of stored keys in a buffer of size s, with l ≤ s, then s − l represents the number of keys which have been
lost by the node. When a sensor node receives an UpdateKey packet carrying a new key k, it calculates F s−l(k) by
applying s− l times the function F . If the result matches with the last received temporal key, then the node stores
k in its buffer and recovers all lost keys.
Reconfiguration. When a node mj joins the network or misses more than s temporal keys, then its buffer is empty. Thus, it
sends a RequestKey packet in order to request the current configuration:
mj −→ ks : RequestKey | mj.
Upon reception, node ks performs authentication ofmj and, if successful, it sends the current configuration via an
InitKey packet.






= σ .D1 synchronise and move to D1
Di
def
= [ki ks+i ⊢enc ti] for i ≥ 1, encrypt ks+i with ki
[UpdateKey ti ⊢pair ui] build the UpdateKey packet ui
!⟨ui⟩.σ .σ .Di+1 broadcast ri , and move to Di+1
Li
def
= ⌊?(r).Ii+1⌋σ .Li+1 wait for request packets
Ii
def
= [r ⊢fst r1]I1i ; σ .σ .Li extract first component
I1i
def
= [r1 = RequestKey]I2i ; σ .σ .Li check if r1 is a RequestKey
I2i
def
= [r ⊢snd m] extract node name
[kks:m ks+i ⊢enc wi] encrypt ks+i with kks:m
[ks+i ⊢hash hi] calculate hash code for ks+i
[wi hi ⊢pair ri] build a pair ri ,
[InitKey ri ⊢pair qi] build a InitKey packet qi ,
σ .!⟨qi⟩.σ .Li broadcast qi , move to Li
Receiver at node m:
Z def= [RequestKey m ⊢pair r] send a RequestKey packet
!⟨r⟩.σ .⌊?(q).T⌋Z wait for a reconfig. packet
T def= [q ⊢fst q′]T 1; σ .Z extract fst component of q
T 1 def= [q′ = InitKey]T 2; σ .Z check if q is a InitKey packet
T 2 def= [q ⊢snd q′′] extract snd component of q
[q′′ ⊢fst w]T 3; σ .Z extract fst component of q′′
T 3 def= [q′′ ⊢snd h] extract snd component of q′′
[kks:m w ⊢dec k]T 3; σ .Z extract the key
T 4 def= [k ⊢hash h′][h = h′]T 5; σ .Z verify hash codes
T 5 def= σ .σ .R⟨F s−1(k), k, s−1⟩ synchronise and move to R
R(kc, kl, l)
def
= ⌊?(u).E⌋F wait for incoming packets
E def= [u ⊢fst u′]E1; σ .F extract fst component of u
E1 def= [u′ = UpdateKey]E2; σ .F check UpdateKey packet
E2 def= [u ⊢snd u′′] extract snd component of u
[kc u′′ ⊢dec k]E3; σ .F decrypt u′′ by using kc
E3 def= [F s−l(k) = kl]E4; σ .F authenticate k
E4 def= σ .σ .R⟨F s−1(k), k, s−1⟩ synchronise and move to R
F def= [l = 0]Z; σ .R⟨F l−1(kl), kl, l−1⟩ check if buffer key is empty
Encoding. In Table 8, we provide a specification in aTCWS of the entire LiSP protocol. We introduce some slight
simplifications with respect to the original protocol. We assume that (i) the temporal keys k0, . . . , kn have already been
computed by ks, (ii) both the buffer size s and the refresh interval ∆refresh are known by each node. Thus, the InitKey packet
can be simplified as follows:
ks −→ mj : enc(kks:mj , ks+i) | hash(ks+i).
Moreover, we assume that every σ -action models the passage of ∆refresh/2 time units. Therefore, every two σ -actions the
key server broadcasts the new temporal key encrypted with the key tied to that specific interval. Finally, we do not model
data encryption.












The protocol executed by the key server is expressed by the following two threads: a key distributor Di and a listener Li
waiting for reconfiguration requests from the sensor nodes, with i being the current time interval. Every ∆refresh time units
(that is, every two σ -actions)Di broadcasts the new temporal key ks+i encryptedwith the key ki of the current time interval i.
The process Li replies to reconfiguration requests by sending an initialisation packet.
At the beginning of the protocol, a sensor node runs the process Z , which broadcasts a request packet to ks, waits for a
reconfiguration packet q, and then checks authenticity by verifying the hash code. If the verification is successful then the
node starts the broadcasting new keys phase. This phase is formalised by the process R(kc, kl, l), where kc is the current
temporal key, kl is the last authenticated temporal key, and the integer l counts the number of keys that are actually stored
in the buffer.
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To simplify the exposition, we formalise the key server as a pair of nodes: a key disposer kd, which executes Di, and a





νmj | kl[σ .L0]νkl | kd[σ .D0]νkd
where for each nodemj, with j ∈ J ,mj ∈ νkd ∩ νkl and {kd, kl} ⊆ νmj .
6.1. Timed integrity
In LiSP, a node should authenticate only keys sent by the key server in the previous ∆refresh time units. Otherwise, a node
needing a reconfiguration would authenticate an obsolete temporal key and it would not be synchronised with the rest
of the network. Here, we will show that, due to the interference of an attacker, key authentication may take longer than
∆refresh time units. In order to exhibit the attack it suffices to focus on a part of the protocol composed by the kl node of the
key server and a single sensor node m. Moreover, in order to make observable a successful reconfiguration, we replace the
process T 4 of Table 8 with the process
T 4
′ def
= σ .σ .[auth k ⊢pair a]!⟨a⟩.R⟨F s−1(k), k, s−1⟩.
Thus, the part of the protocol under examination can be defined as follows:
LiSP′ def= m[σ .Z ′]νm | kl[σ .L0]νkl .
Our freshness requirement on authenticated keys can be expressed by the following abstraction of the protocol:






τ .σ .σ .!⟨authi+1⟩.R(ki+1, ks+i, s − 1)







τ .σ .!⟨qi+1⟩.σ .L̂i+1

σ .L̂i+1, and qi = pair(InitKey ri) with ri = pair(enc(kks:m, ks+i), hash(ks+i)) as defined as in
Table 8.
It is easy to see that ρ(LiSP′) is a correct abstraction of the timed integrity property of the protocol, as the action authi occurs
exactly ∆refresh time units (that is, two σ -actions) after the disclosure of key ks+i through packet qi.






−−−−−−−→ implies #σ (Ω) = 2.
In order to show that LiSP′ satisfies our security analysis, we should prove that
LiSP′ ∈ tGNDC ρ(LiSP
′)
φ0,O




and initial knowledge φ0 = ∅. However, this is not the case.
Theorem 6.2 (Replay Attack to LiSP).
LiSP′ ∉ tGNDC ρ(LiSP
′)
∅,{kl,m}.
Proof. Let us define the set of attacking nodes A = {a, b} for LiSP′. Let us fix the initial knowledge of the attacker φ0 = ∅.
We set νa = {m, b} and νb = {kl, a}, and we assume that O = {kl,m}. We give an intuition of the replay attack in Table 9.
Basically, an attacker may prevent the node m to receive the InitKey packet within ∆refresh time units. As a consequence, m
may complete the protocol only after 2∆refresh time units (that is, four σ -actions), so authenticating an old key.
Formally, we define the attacker A ∈ Aφ0A/{kl,m} as A = a[σ
3.X]νa
 b[σ 2.X]νb where X = ⌊?(x).σ .!⟨x⟩.nil⌋nil. We then
consider the system (LiSP′)AO | Awhich admits the following execution trace:
σ . !r◃obs . σ . !q1◃obs . σ . τ . !r◃obs . σ . τ . σ . σ . !auth1◃obs
containing four σ -actions between the packets q1 and auth1. By Proposition 6.1, this trace cannot be matched by ρ(LiSP′).
So, (LiSP′)AO
 A .̸ ρ(LiSP′). 
6.2. Timed agreement
The timed agreement property for LiSP requires that when a sensor nodem completes the protocol, apparently with the
initiator kl, then kl has initiated the protocol, apparently with m, at most ∆refresh time units before, and the two parties
agree on the transmitted data. In other words: the packet qi must be received and authenticated by m exactly ∆refresh time
units after it has been sent by kl. This suggests that any formulation of timed agreement for LiSP would actually coincide
with timed integrity. Thus, Proposition 6.1 demonstrates that ρ(LiSP′) is also a faithful abstraction of timed agreement. As
a consequence, Theorem 6.2 also says that LiSP does not satisfies timed agreement.
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Table 9
Replay attack to LiSP.
m −→ kl : r m sends a RequestKey and kl correctly receives the packet
σ
−−→ the system moves to the next time slot
kl −→ m : q1 kl replies with an InitKey which is lost bym and grasped by b
σ
−−→ the system moves to the next time slot
b −→ a : q1 b sends q1 to a
m −→ kl : r m sends a new RequestKey which gets lost
σ
−−→ the system moves to the next time slot




−−→ after ∆refresh time units
m −→ ∗ : auth1 m authenticates q1 and signals the end of the protocol
7. Conclusions, related and future work
We have proposed a timed broadcasting calculus, called aTCWS, to formalise and verify real-world key management
protocols for WSNs. Our calculus comes with a well-defined operational semantics and a simulation-based behavioural
semantics. Then, we have revised Gorrieri and Martinelli’s tGNDC framework [12] in such a way that it can be applied to
WSNs. We have used tGNDC to express two timed properties of wireless security protocols: timed integrity and timed
agreement. A nice aspect of expressing a security property as a tGNDC-property is that when it does not hold then it is
possible to exhibit an attack which invalidate the property. In order to prove tGNDC-properties in an effective manner, we
have provided a compositional proof technique based on the notion of the most powerful attacker. Notice that, as pointed
out in Remarks 3.8 and 3.9, the top attacker used in our proof technique is slightlymore powerful than any process in aTCWS.
As a consequence, our proof technique for tGNDC is sound but not complete. Nevertheless, when a protocol can be attacked
by the top attacker there are good chances that the same attack can be perpetrated by a real attacker.
We have provided formal specifications in aTCWS of threewell-known keymanagement protocols forWSNs:µTESLA [1],
LEAP+ [3] and LiSP [2]. Our specifications meet the requirements of Proposition 2.10, thus they all satisfy well-timedness.
Then, we have formally proved that the single-hop pairwise shared key mechanism of LEAP+ enjoys timed integrity, and
that the authenticated-broadcast phase ofµTESLA enjoys both timed integrity and timed agreement.We have provided two
different replay attacks to show that the single-hop pairwise shared keymechanism of LEAP+ do not enjoy timed agreement,
and that LiSP satisfies neither timed integrity nor timed agreement. The kind of attack occurring in LiSP cannot be repeated
in LEAP+ or µTESLA as these two protocols assume the presence of nonces which guarantee message freshness. We could
use the same precaution in LiSP, by adding a nonce in all RequestKey and InitKey packets [18]. However, as seen for LEAP+
the addition of nonces in LiSP would fix timed integrity but not timed agreement.
The present work is the continuation and generalisation of [19], where a slight variant of the calculus was introduced,
and an early security analysis for the authenticated-broadcast phase of µTESLA and the single-hop pairwise shared key
mechanism of LEAP+ was performed. In [18] the calculus aTCWS has been used to analyse the LiSP protocol. The design of
our calculus is strongly inspired by tCryptoSPA [12], a timed ‘‘cryptographic’’ variant of Milner’s CCS [20], where node
distribution, local broadcast communication and message loss are codified in terms of point-to-point transmission and a
discrete notion of time. As a consequence, specifications and security analyses ofwireless network protocols intCryptoSPA
are much more complicated than ours. The tGNDC schema for tCryptoSPA, has already been used by Gorrieri et al. [13]
to study a number security protocols, for both wired and wireless networks. In particular, they studied the authenticated-
broadcast phase of µTESLA, proving timed integrity. The formalisation for µTESLA we have proposed here is much less
involved than the one of [13] thanks to the specific features of our calculus for broadcast communications.
Several process calculi for wireless systems have been recently proposed. Mezzetti and Sangiorgi [21] have introduced
a calculus to describe interferences in wireless systems. Nanz and Hankin [22] have proposed a calculus for mobile ad hoc
networks for specification and security analysis of communication protocols. They provide a decision procedure to check
security against fixed intruders known in advance.Merro [23] has proposed a behavioural theory formobile ad hoc networks.
Godskesen [24] has proposed a calculus for mobile ad hoc networks with a formalisation of an attack on the cryptographic
routing protocol ARAN. Singh et al. [25] have proposed the ω-calculus for modelling the AODV routing protocol. Ghassemi
et al. [26,27] have proposed a process algebra, provided with model checking and equational reasoning, which models
topology changes implicitly in the semantics. Merro and Sibilio [28] have proposed a timed calculus for wireless systems
focusing on the notion of communication collision. Godskesen and Nanz [29] have proposed a simple timed calculus for
wireless systems to express awide range ofmobilitymodels. Gallina and Rossi [30] have proposed a calculus for the analysis
of energy-aware communications inmobile ad hoc networks. Song and Godskesen [31] have proposed the first probabilistic
un-timed calculus formobilewireless systems inwhich connection probabilitiesmay change due to nodemobility. Kouzapas
and Philippou [32] have proposed a process calculus for dynamic networks which contains features for broadcasting at
multiple transmission ranges and for viewing networks at different levels of abstraction.
Recently, Arnaud et al. [33] have proposed a calculus for modelling and reasoning about security protocols, including
secure routing protocols, for a bounded number of sessions. They provide two NPTIME decision procedures for analysing
routing protocols for any network topology, and apply their framework to analyse the protocol SRP [34] applied to DSR [35].
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The AVISPA model checker [36] has been used in [37] for an analysis of TinySec [38], LEAP [39], and TinyPK [40], three
wireless sensor network security protocols, and in [41] for an analysis of the Sensor Network Encryption Protocol SNEP [1]. In
particular, in [37] the authors considered the communication between immediate neighbour nodes which use the pairwise
shared key already established by LEAP. In this case AVISPA found a man-in-the-middle attack where the intruder may play
at the same time the role of two nodes in order to obtain real information from one of them, thus loosing confidentiality.
It is our intention to apply our framework to study the correctness of awide range of wireless network security protocols,
as for instance, MiniSec [42], and evolutions of LEAP+, such as R-LEAP+ [43] and LEAP++ [44].
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Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.4. We single out each item of the proposition.
Item 1. The forward direction is an instance of rule (RcvEnb), the converse is proved by a straightforward rule induction.
Item 2. The forward direction follows by noticing that only rules (RcvEnb) and (RcvPar) are suitable for deriving the action
m?w fromM1 | M2; in the case of rule (RcvEnb)we just apply rule (RcvEnb) both onM1 and onM2, in the case of rule (RcvPar)
the premises require both M1 and M2 to perform an action m?w and to move to N1 and N2 with N = N1 | N2. The converse
is an instance of rule (σ -Par).
Item 3. The result is a consequence of the combination of rules (Snd) and (Bcast) and it is proved by a straightforward rule
induction.
Item 4. Again, the proof is done by a straightforward rule induction.
Item 5. The forward direction follows by noticing that the only rule for deriving the action σ from M1 | M2 is (σ -Par) which,
in the premises, requires bothM1 andM2 to perform an action σ . The converse is an instance of rule (σ -Par). 
Proposition A.1. If M . N then nds (N) ⊆ nds (M).
Proof. By contradiction. Assume there exists a node m such that m ∈ nds (N) and m /∈ nds (M). Then, by rule (RcvEnb),
M
m?w
−−−−→ M . SinceM . N there must be N ′ such that N m?w====⇒ N ′ withM ′ . N ′. However, sincem ∈ nds (N), by inspection
on the transition rules, there is no way to deduce a weak transition of the form N m?w====⇒ N ′. 
Proof of Theorem 2.12. We prove that the relation
R =
 
M | O, N | O

s.t.M . N and M | O, N | O are well-formed

is a simulation. We proceed by case analysis on why M | O
α
−−→ Z . The interesting cases are when the transition is due to
an interaction betweenM and O. The remaining cases are more elementary.
Let M | O
!w◃ν
−−−−→ M ′ | O′ (ν ≠ ∅) by an application of rule (Obs), because M | O
m!w◃η
−−−−−→ M ′ | O′, by an application of




−−−−−→ M ′ and O
m?w
−−−−→ O′, with m ∈ nds (M) and η = µ \ nds (O). By an application of rule (Obs) we obtain that
M
!w◃µ
−−−−→ M ′. SinceM . N , it follows that there is N ′ such that N
!w◃µ
====⇒ N ′ withM ′ . N ′. This implies that there exists
h ∈ nds (N) such that N
h!w◃µ′
=====⇒ N ′ with µ ⊆ µ′. Moreover:
(a) h /∈ nds (O), as N | O is well-formed and it cannot contain two nodes with the same name;
(b) µ′ ⊆ ngh(h,N), by Proposition 2.43;
(c) If k ∈ µ′ ∩ nds (O) then h ∈ ngh(k,O), as the neighbouring relation is symmetric.
Now, in case O
m?w
−−−−→ O′ exclusively by rule (RcvEnb) then also O
h?w
−−−→ O′ by rule (RcvEnb) and item (a). In case
the derivation of O
m?w
−−−−→ O′ involves some applications of the rule (Rcv) then the concerned nodes have the form
k[⌊?(x).P⌋Q ]π with k ∈ µ, hence h ∈ ngh(k,O) by item (c), and so we can derive O
h?w
−−−→ O′ by applying the
rules (RcvEnb) and (RcvPar).
Thus we have O
h?w
−−−→ O′ in any case. Then by an application of rule (Bcast) and several applications of rule (TauPar)
we have N | O
h!w◃η′
=====⇒ N ′ | O′ with η′ = µ′ \ nds (O). Now, since µ ⊆ µ′ we have µ \ nds (O) ⊆ µ′ \ nds (O)
hence ν ⊆ η ⊆ η′. As ν ≠ ∅, by an application of rule (Obs) and several applications of rule (TauPar) it follows that
N | O !w◃ν====⇒ N ′ | O′. SinceM ′ . N ′, we obtain (M ′ | O′, N ′ | O′) ∈ R.
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2. M
m?w
−−−−→ M ′ and O
m!w◃µ
−−−−−→ O′, with m ∈ nds (O) and η = µ \ nds (M). Since M . N , it follows that there is N ′
such that N m?w====⇒ N ′ with M ′ . N ′. By an application of rule (Bcast) and several applications of rule (TauPar) we have
N | O
m!w◃η′
======⇒ N ′ | O′, with η′ = µ \ nds (N). Since M . N , by Proposition A.1 we have η ⊆ η′. Thus ν ⊆ η′ and by an
application of rule (Obs) and several applications of rule (TauPar) it follows that N | O !w◃ν====⇒ N ′ | O′. Since M ′ . N ′, we
obtain (M ′ | O′, N ′ | O′) ∈ R.
Let M | O
τ
−−→ M ′ | O′ by an application of rule (Shh) because M | O
m!w◃∅




−−−−→ M ′ | O′ by an application of rule (RcvPar) becauseM
m?w
−−−−→ M ′ and O
m?w
−−−−→ O′. SinceM . N , it follows
that there isN ′ such thatN m?w====⇒ N ′ withM ′ . N ′. By an application of rule (RcvPar) and several applications of rule (TauPar)
we have N | O m?w====⇒ N ′ | O′. Since M ′ . N ′, we obtain (M ′ | O′, N ′ | O′) ∈ R.
Let M | O
σ
−−→ M ′ | O′ by an application of rule (σ -Par) because M
σ
−−→ M ′ and O
σ
−−→ O′. This case is similar to the
previous one. 









 Topφ0A1⊎A2/nds(M) . M1A1O1  M2A2O2  Topφ0A1⊎A2/nds(M).
To improve readability, we consider themost general case, that isO1 = nds (M1) andO2 = nds (M2). Moreover, we assume









2 with {a1, obs} ⊆ ν ′1 ⊆ {a1,m2, obs} and {a2, obs} ⊆ ν
′
2 ⊆ {a2,m1, obs};
• MA11 = m1[P1]
ν′′1 with ν ′′1 = {a1, obs};
• MA22 = m2[P2]
ν′′2 with ν ′′2 = {a2, obs}.





2 | Topφ0A/P . m1[P1]
ν′′1 | m2[P2]ν
′′
2 | Topφ0A/P .























































α = m?w . This case is straightforward. In fact, the environment of the system contains exclusively the node obs which
cannot transmit; thus the rule (Rcv) cannot be applied. We can consider just the rules (RcvEnb) and (RcvPar), which
do not modify the network.






i (for i = 1, 2) and N
σ





















α = !w◃ν. We observe: (i) the environment of the system contains just the node obs and (ii) Env (N) = {m1,m2}. Thus



























−−−−→ N̂ . Now, to prove the similarity, we need to simulate the m1?w-action at the node
m2[Q2]ν
′′
2 which cannot actually receive packets from m1 /∈ ν ′′2 . We first observe that the message w can be







A/P . Since a2 ∈ ν
′′
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2 | N̂ . Since obs ∈ ν ′1 ∩ ν
′
2, the broadcast action must be performed by N; thus there exists i ∈
{1, 2} such that N
ai!w◃mi


































Lemma A.2. If M is time-dependent stable with respect to a sequence of knowledge {φj}j≥0, A is a set of attacking nodes for M
and O ⊆ nds (M) then
MAO
 A . MAO  Topφ0A/nds(M) for every A ∈ Aφ0A/nds(M).
Proof. We prove the lemma in the most general case, that is O = nds (M). Then we fix an arbitrary A ∈ Aφ0A/nds(M) and we





























∈ R and we make a case analysis on whyM ′ | A′
α
−−→ N .
α = m?w. As for Lemma 3.10, this case is straightforward.
α = σ . Then N = M ′′ | A′′ with M ′
σ
−−→ M ′′ and A′
σ






A/nds(M) by (σ -Sum), hence by




−−→ M ′′ | Top
φj+1
A/nds(M).
α = !w◃ν. Since the environment of the system contains just the node obs, the transition has to be derived by the rule (Obs)
whose premise isM ′ | A′
m!w◃obs








andN = M ′′ | A′′ withM ′
m!w◃ν′
−−−−−−→












A/nds(M) by rule (RcvEnb). Hence




−−−−−−→ M ′′ | Top
φj















−−−−−→ M ′′ | Top
φj
A/nds(M).
α = τ . The most significant case is when the transition τ is derived by an application of rule (Shh), then we have
M ′ | A′
a!w◃∅












can be observed by the node obs. In this case we haveM ′
a?w
−−−→ M ′′ and A′
a!w◃m
−−−−−→ A′′ wherem is the single node








A/nds(M) by rules (Tau) and (Snd) since the attacking node













==⇒ M ′′ | Top
φj
A/nds(M) by rule (Shh). 
Proof of Theorem 3.11. By Lemma A.2 we haveMAO | A . M
AO | Topφ0A/nds(M) for every A ∈ A
φ0
A/nds(M). Then by transitivity




Proof of Proposition 4.1. By induction on i we show that whenever bs[σ .S1]obs
Λ
==⇒ bs[Si]obs or mj[σ .R̂1]obs
Λ
==⇒ mj[R̂i]obs
then#σ (Λ) = 2i−1.Moreover, we observe that !pi◃obs can be performed exclusively as bs[Si]obs
!pi◃obs
−−−−−→.While !endi◃obs




−−−−−−−→ with #σ Ω = 2. Hence we deduce that:









−−−−−−−→ for some 1 ≤ j ≤ k, then #σ (Λ) = 2(i − 1) + 4.
Now, the result is a straightforward consequence of these two properties. 
Proof of Lemma 4.2. We provide the proper simulation in both the cases.
Case 1: Base Station.Wenotice that anyprocess Si, alongwith its derivatives, cannot receive anymessage. Thus an attacker in b
cannot affect the behaviour of bs[σ .S1]{b,obs}. Hence it is straightforward to prove that bs[σ .S1]{b,obs} | Top
φ0
b/bs . bs[σ .S1]
obs.
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Case 2: Nodes. We fix a node m ∈ {m1, . . . ,mh}, we let a ∈ {a1, . . . , ah} denote the corresponding attacking place and we
show that
m[σ .R′⟨1, −1, ⊥, k̄⟩]{a,obs} | Topφ0a/m . m[σ .R̂1]
obs.
To uniform the notation, we define k−1
def
= k̄. We pick the indexes i ≥ 1 and −1 ≥ l ≥ i − 2, and the messages r̂ , p̂, k̂ and q̂.
Then we build the relation Rl,r̂i (p̂, k̂, q̂) which contains the pair





along with its derivatives which may be generated when m first receives p̂ and then k̂ from the attacker. To improve the
readability: (i) we define ν ′m
def
= {a, obs}, (ii) we employ the structural congruence ≡ to rewrite the process R̂i as:
R̂i
def
= σ .P̂i P̂i
def








m[R′⟨i, l, r̂, kl⟩]ν
′










m[σ .P ′⟨i, l, p̂, r̂, kl⟩]ν
′










m[P ′⟨i, l, p̂, r̂, kl⟩]ν
′










m[T ′⟨i, l, p̂, r̂, kl, k̂⟩]ν
′










m[Q ′⟨i, l, r̂, kl⟩]ν
′










m[Z ′⟨i+1, i−1, p̂, r̂, ki−1⟩]ν
′










and we show that the required simulation is

m[σ .R′⟨1, −1, ⊥, k̄⟩]{a,obs} | Topφ0a/m , m[σ .R̂1]
obs 



















Weoutline themost significant cases.We omit input actions since the environment contains exclusively the node obswhich
cannot transmit, thus all input actions can be derived just by combining rules (RcvEnb) and (RcvPar). We also omit τ -actions
generated by internal choices of the attacker.
In the pair

m[R′⟨i, l, r̂, kl⟩]ν
′
m | Topφ2i−1a/m , m[R̂i]
obs  we have a significant action:




−−→ m[Q ′⟨i, l, r̂, kl⟩]ν
′











we have two significant actions:




−−→ m[σ .P ′⟨i, l, p̂, r̂, kl⟩]ν
′
m | Topφ2i−1a/m , where m receives p̂ from the attacker. Then
m[R̂i]obs =⇒ m[R̂i]obs.




−−→ m[R′⟨i, l, r̂, kl⟩]ν
′
m | Topφ2i−1a/m , where p̂ gets lost. Thenm[R̂i]
obs
=⇒ m[R̂i]obs.
D. Macedonio, M. Merro / Science of Computer Programming 81 (2014) 53–78 75
In the pair

m[σ .P ′⟨i, l, p̂, r̂, kl⟩]ν
′
m | Topφ2i−1a/m , m[R̂i]
obs  we have just a significant action:




−−→ m[P ′⟨i, l, p̂, r̂, kl⟩]ν
′






m[P ′⟨i, l, p̂, r̂, kl⟩]ν
′
m | Topφ2ia/m, m[P̂i]
obs  we have just a significant action:




−−→ m[R′⟨i+1, l, p̂, kl⟩]ν
′











we have two significant actions:




−−→ m[T ′⟨i, l, p̂, r̂, kl, k̂⟩]ν
′
m | Topφ2ia/m, where m receives k̂. Then the second network
replies withm[P̂i]obs =⇒ m[P̂i]obs.




−−→ m[P ′⟨i, l, p̂, r̂, kl⟩]ν
′
m | Topφ2ia/m, where k̂ gets lost. The second network replies
with m[P̂i]obs =⇒ m[P̂i]obs.
In the pair

m[T ′⟨i, l, p̂, r̂, kl, k̂⟩]ν
′
m | Topφ2ia/m, m[P̂i]
obs  we have three significant actions:




−−→ m[Z ′⟨i+1, i−1, p̂, r̂, ki−1⟩]ν
′
m | Topφ2i+1a/m where m checks that kl = F
i−1−l(ĥ) and
authenticates r̂ = pi−1. Then m[P̂i]obs
σ
==⇒ m[Ẑi+1]obs.




−−→ m[R′⟨i+1, i−1, p̂, ki−1⟩]ν
′
m | Topφ2i+1a/m where m checks that kl = F
i−l(ĥ) without but
it does not authenticate r̂ . Then m[P̂i]obs
σ
==⇒ m[R̂i+1]obs.




−−→ m[R′⟨i+1, l, p̂, kl⟩]ν
′




==⇒ m[R̂i+1]obs by timeout.
In the pair

m[Q ′⟨i, l, r̂, kl⟩]ν
′
m | Topφ2ia/m, m[P̂i]
obs  we have a significant action




−−→ m[R⟨i+1, l, r̂, kl⟩]ν
′











the first network can perform two significant actions




−−→ m[T ⟨i, l, r̂, r̂, kl, k̂⟩]ν
′
m | Topφ2ia/m, where m receives k̂. Then the second network
repliesm[P̂i]obs =⇒ m[P̂i]obs.




−−→ m[R⟨i+1, l, r̂, kl⟩]ν
′
m | Topφ2ia/m, where k̂ gets lost. Then the second network replies
m[P̂i]obs =⇒ m[P̂i]obs. 
Proof of Proposition 5.1. Similar to that of Proposition 4.1. 
Proof of Theorem 5.2. The system (LEAP′+)A | A admits the following computation:
m[σ .S1]νm | r[σ .R′]νr | A
σ
−−→
m[S1]νm | r[R′]νr | a[X]νa | b[σ .X]νb
!hello1◃obs
−−−−−−−−→
m[σ .P]νm | r[R′]νr | a[σ .!⟨hello1⟩.nil]νa | b[σ .X]νb
σ
−−→
m[P]νm | r[σ .R′]νr | a[!⟨hello1⟩.nil]νa | b[X]νb
τ
−−→
m[{hello1/q}P1]νm | r[σ .R′]νr | a[nil]νa | b[σ .!⟨hello1⟩.nil]νb
σ
−−→
m[S2]νm | r[R′]νr | a[nil]νa | b[!⟨hello1⟩.nil]νb
τ
−−→
m[S2]νm | r[σ .!⟨q1⟩.R8
′
]
νr | a[nil]νa | b[nil]νb
!hello2◃obs
−−−−−−−−→
m[σ .P]νm | r[σ .!⟨q1⟩.R8
′
]












νr | a[nil]νa | b[nil]νb
σ
−−→
m[S3]νm | r[!⟨end1⟩.nil]νr | a[nil]νa | b[nil]νb
!end1◃obs
−−−−−−−→
Then agreement is not reached. 
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Proof of Lemma 5.4. We prove this lemma by showing the appropriate simulations.
Case 1: Sender. We define ν ′m = {a, obs}. We need to prove m[σ .S1]
ν′m | Topφ0a/m . m[σ .Ŝ1]
obs. Thus we fix an index






ν′m | Topφ2i−1a/m , m[Ŝi]


















































































































ν′m | Topφ2i−1a/m , m[Ŝi]
obs  we have a significant action:
• m[S ′′i ]
ν′m | Topφ2i−1a/m
!helloi◃obs
−−−−−−−→ m[σ .P ′′]ν
′


















we have a significant action:
































































































































Case 2: Receiver. To show that r[σ .R]{b} | Topφ0b/r . r[Tick]
∅ we define the following relation:
R
def
= {(M, r[Tick]∅) such that r[σ .R]{b} | Topφ0b/r
Λ
==⇒ M}.





−−→ or input actions that can be derived without applying rule (Rcv). Then it is straightforward to prove that R is a
simulation. 
Proof of Proposition 6.1. Similar to that of Proposition 4.1. 




| A admits the following computation:
m[σ .Z ′]νm | kl[σ .L0]νkl | A
σ
−−→
m[Z ′]νm | kl[L0]νkl | a[σ 2.X]νa
 b[σ .X]νb !r◃obs−−−−−→
m[σ .⌊?(q).T ′⌋Z ′]νm | kl[{r/r}I1]νkl | a[σ 2.X]νa
 b[σ .X]νb σ−−→
m[⌊?(q).T ′⌋Z ′]νm | kl[!⟨q1⟩.σ .L1]νkl | a[σ .X]νa | b[X]νb
!q1◃obs
−−−−−→
m[⌊?(q).T ′⌋Z ′]νm | kl[σ .L1]νkl | a[σ .X]νa | b[σ .!⟨q1⟩.nil]νb
σ
−−→
m[Z ′]νm | kl[L1]νkl | a[X]νa | b[!⟨q1⟩.nil]νb
τ
−−→
m[Z ′]νm | kl[{q1/r}I2]νkl | a[σ .!⟨q1⟩.nil]νa | b[nil]νb
!r◃obs
−−−−−→
m[σ .⌊?(q).T ′⌋Z ′]νm | kl[{q1/r}I2]νkl | a[σ .!⟨q1⟩.nil]νa | b[nil]νb
σ
−−→
m[⌊?(q).T ′⌋Z ′]νm | kl[σ .L2]νkl | a[!⟨q1⟩.nil]νa | b[nil]νb
τ
−−→
m[{q1/q}T ′]νm | kl[σ .L2]νkl | a[nil]νa | b[nil]νb
σ
−−→
m[σ .!⟨auth1⟩.R(k2, ks+1, s − 1)]νm | kl[L2]νkl | a[nil]νa | b[nil]νb
σ
−−→
m[!⟨auth1⟩.R(k2, ks+1, s − 1)]νm | kl[σ .L3]νkl | a[nil]νa | b[nil]νb
!auth1◃obs
−−−−−−−→
Thenm signals the correct reconfiguration based on an old packet. 
References
[1] A. Perrig, R. Szewczyk, J.D. Tygar, V. Wen, D. Culler, SPINS: security protocols for sensor networks, Wireless Networks 8 (5) (2002) 521–534.
[2] T. Park, K.G. Shin, LiSP: a lightweight security protocol for wireless sensor networks, ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems (TECS) 3
(3) (2004) 634–660.
[3] S. Zhu, S. Setia, S. Jajodia, LEAP+: efficient security mechanisms for large-scale distributed sensor networks, ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks 2
(4) (2006) 500–528.
[4] S. Basagni, K. Herrin, D. Bruschi, E. Rosti, Secure pebblenets, in: ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing
(MobiHoc), 2001, pp. 156–163.
[5] R.J. Anderson, H. Chan, A. Perrig, Key infection: smart trust for smart dust, in: IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP), 2004,
pp. 206–215.
[6] W. Diffiel, M.E. Hellman, New directions in cryptography, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 22 (6) (1976) 644–654.
[7] R.L. Rivest, A. Shamir, L.M. Adleman, A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems, Communications of the ACM 21 (2)
(1978) 120–126.
[8] M. Hennessy, T. Regan, A process algebra for timed systems, Information and Computation 117 (2) (1995) 221–239.
[9] B. Sundararaman, U. Buy, A.D. Kshemkalyani, Clock synchronization for wireless sensor networks: a survey, Ad Hoc Networks 3 (3) (2005) 281–323.
[10] T. Nipkow, L.C. Paulson, M.Wenzel, Isabelle/HOL—A Proof Assistant for Higher-Order Logic, in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2283, Springer,
2002.
[11] Y. Bertot, A short presentation of Coq, in: International Conference on Theorem Proving in Higher Order Logics (TPHOLs 2007), in: LNCS, vol. 5170,
2008, pp. 12–16.
[12] R. Gorrieri, F. Martinelli, A simple framework for real-time cryptographic protocol analysis with compositional proof rules, Science of Computer
Programming 50 (1–3) (2004) 23–49.
[13] R. Gorrieri, F. Martinelli, M. Petrocchi, Formalmodels and analysis of securemulticast inwired andwireless networks, Journal of Automated Reasoning
41 (3–4) (2008) 325–364.
[14] S. Misra, I. Woungag, Guide to Wireless Ad Hoc Networks, Computer Communications and Networks, Springer, London, ISBN: 978-1-84800-327-9,
2009.
[15] X. Nicollin, J. Sifakis, An overview and synthesis on timed process algebras, in: International Workshop on Computer Aided Verification (CAV),
in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 575, Springer, 1991, pp. 376–398.
[16] R. Focardi, F. Martinelli, A uniform approach for the definition of security properties, in: World Congress on Formal Methods (FM), in: Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, vol. 1708, Springer, 1999, pp. 794–813.
[17] A. Perrig, R. Szewczyk, V.Wen, D.E. Culler, J.D. Tygar, SPINS: security protocols for sensor netowrks, in: International Conference onMobile Computing
and Networking (MOBICOM), 2001, pp. 189–199.
78 D. Macedonio, M. Merro / Science of Computer Programming 81 (2014) 53–78
[18] D. Macedonio, M. Merro, A semantics analysis of wireless network security protocols, in: NASA Formal Methods Symposium (NFM), in: Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, vol. 7226, Springer, Heidelberg, 2012, pp. 403–417.
[19] F. Ballardin, M. Merro, A calculus for the analysis of wireless network security protocols, in: Formal Aspects in Security and Trust (FAST), in: Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol. 6561, Springer, 2010, pp. 206–222.
[20] R. Milner, Communication and Concurrency, Prentice Hall, 1989.
[21] I. Lanese, D. Sangiorgi, An operational semantics for a calculus for wireless systems, Theoretical Computer Science 411 (2010) 1928–1948.
[22] S. Nanz, C. Hankin, A framework for security analysis of mobile wireless networks, Theoretical Computer Science 367 (1–2) (2006) 203–227.
[23] M. Merro, An observational theory for mobile ad hoc networks (full paper), Information and Computation 207 (2) (2009) 194–208.
[24] J. Godskesen, A calculus formobile ad hoc networks, in: CoordinationModels and Languages (COORDINATION), in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
vol. 4467, Springer, 2007, pp. 132–150.
[25] A. Singh, C.R. Ramakrishnan, S.A. Smolka, A process calculus for mobile ad hoc networks, in: Coordination Models and Languages (COORDINATION),
in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 5052, Springer, 2008, pp. 296–314.
[26] F. Ghassemi, W. Fokkink, A. Movaghar, Equational reasoning on mobile ad hoc networks, Fundamenta Informaticae 105 (4) (2010) 375–415.
[27] F. Ghassemi, W. Fokkink, A. Movaghar, Verification of mobile ad hoc networks: an algebraic approach, Theoretical Computer Science 412 (28) (2011)
3262–3282.
[28] M. Merro, E. Sibilio, A timed calculus for wireless systems, in: Fundamentals of Software Engineering (FSEN), in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
vol. 5961, Springer, 2010, pp. 228–243.
[29] J.C. Godskesen, S. Nanz, Mobility models and behavioural equivalence for wireless networks, in: Coordination Models and Languages
(COORDINATION), in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 5521, Springer, 2009, pp. 106–122.
[30] L. Gallina, S. Rossi, A calculus for power-aware multicast communications in ad hoc networks, in: Theoretical Computer Science—6th IFIP TC 1/WG
2.2 International Conference (IFIP TCS), in: IFIP, vol. 323, Springer, 2010, pp. 20–31.
[31] L. Song, J.C. Godskesen, Probabilistic mobility models for mobile and wireless networks, in: Theoretical Computer Science—6th IFIP TC 1/WG 2.2
International Conference (IFIP TCS), in: IFIP, vol. 323, Springer, 2010, pp. 86–100.
[32] D. Kouzapas, A. Philippou, A process calculus for dynamic networks, in: Formal Techniques for Distributed Systems (FMOODS/FORTE), in: Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol. 6722, Springer, 2011, pp. 213–227.
[33] M. Arnaud, V. Cortier, S. Delaune, Modeling and verifying ad hoc routing protocols, in: IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF), IEEE
Computer Society, 2010, pp. 59–74.
[34] P. Papadimitratos, Z.J. Haas, Secure link state routing formobile ad hoc networks, in: Symposium on Applications and the InternetWorkshops (SAINT),
ACM, 2003, pp. 379–383.
[35] D.B. Johnson, D.A. Maltz, Dynamic source routing in ad hocwireless networks, in:Mobile Computing, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996, pp. 153–181.
[36] A. Armando, D.A. Basin, Y. Boichut, Y. Chevalier, L. Compagna, J. Cuéllar, P.H. Drielsma, P.-C. Héam, O. Kouchnarenko, J. Mantovani, S. Mödersheim, D.
vonOheimb,M. Rusinowitch, J. Santiago,M. Turuani, L. Viganò, L. Vigneron, The AVISPA tool for the automated validation of internet security protocols
and applications, in: International Conference on Computer Aided Verification (CAV), in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3576, Springer, 2005,
pp. 281–285.
[37] M.L. Tobarra, D. Cazorla, F. Cuartero, G. Díaz, M.-E. Cambronero, Model checking wireless sensor network security protocols: TinySec + LEAP + TinyPK,
Telecommunication Systems 40 (3–4) (2009) 91–99.
[38] C. Karlof, N. Sastry, D. Wagner, TinySec: a link layer security architecture for wireless sensor networks, in: International Conference on Enbedded
Networked Sensor Systems (SenSys), ACM, 2004, pp. 162–175.
[39] S. Zhu, S. Setia, S. Jajodia, LEAP—efficient security mechanisms for large-scale distributed sensor networks, in: International Conference on Enbedded
Networked Sensor Systems (SenSys), ACM, 2003, pp. 308–309.
[40] R.J. Watro, D. Kong, S. fen Cuti, C. Gardiner, C. Lynn, P. Kruus, TinyPK: securing sensor networks with public key technology, in: ACM Workshop on
Security of ad hoc and Sensor Networks (SASN), ACM, 2004, pp. 59–64.
[41] M.L. Tobarra, D. Cazorla, F. Cuartero, Formal analysis of sensor network encryption protocol (SNEP), in: IEEE International Conference onMobile Adhoc
and Sensor Systems (MASS), IEEE CS, 2007, pp. 1–6.
[42] M. Luk, G. Mezzour, A. Perrig, V.D. Gligor, MiniSec: a secure sensor network communication architecture, in: International Conference on Information
Processing in Sensor Networks (IPSN), ACM, 2007, pp. 479–488.
[43] S. Blackshear, R. Verma, R-LEAP+: randomizing LEAP+ keydistribution to resist replay and jamming attacks, in: ACMSymposiumonApplied Computing
(SAC), ACM Press, 2010, pp. 1985–1992.
[44] C.H. Lim, LEAP++: a robust key establishment scheme for wireless sensor networks, in: IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing
Systems Workshops (ICDCS), IEEE Computer Society, 2008, pp. 376–381.
